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THE DISMANTLING OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMS: EVALUATING
CITY OF RICHMOND v. JA. CROSON CO.
by Dianne E. Dixon*
I. INTRODUCTION
As a tribute to the 25th anniversary of the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,1 the conservative majority of the United States
Supreme Court struck down, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,2 a
Richmond, Virginia, set-aside program for minority contractors as violative
of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The decision
represents a profound departure from the Court's prior stance regarding
affirmative action programs because it constitutes the first time a majority
of the Court has held that race-based remedial governmental programs are
subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review under the equal protection
clause.4 The anxiety felt by civil rights activists over this decision is both
widespread and justified given that such a high standard of review has
usually proven to be "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."s
II. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Set-Aside Plan
In April 1983, the Richmond City Council (the Council) began the
* Associate Counsel, Center for Law & Social Justice at Medgar Evers College, City
University of New York, Brooklyn, New York. B.A. 1979, Princeton University; J.D. 1982,
New York University School of Law. The author serves as counsel on cases in state and
federal forums dealing with issues of discrimination in employment, education, voting and
housing.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1975 to 1975d, 2000a to 2000d-4, 2000e to 2000h-6 (1988)).
2. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
3. Id. at 730. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 734 (Kennedy,
J., concurring); id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring).
5. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
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Minority Business Utilization Plan (the Plan) which required prime
contractors, who were awarded construction contracts, to subcontract 30%
or more of the dollar amount of the contract to minority business
enterprises (MBEs).' The Plan contained a waiver provision of the 30%
set-aside for any prime contractor who could show that he made a good
faith effort to comply with the requirement but that qualified MBEs were
"unavailable or unwilling to participate in the contract."7 The final
determination of all waivers was decided by the city's Director of General
Services because the Plan contained no provision for an administrative
appeal!
The Plan, which was to expire five years after its inception, was
declared "'remedial' in nature, and enacted 'for the purpose of promoting
wider participation by minority business enterprises in the construction of
public projects.'"9 At the time that the Plan was adopted, minority group
members constituted half of Richmond's population, yet minority
contractors received less than 1% (.67%) of total city contracting
dollars.' The 30% set-aside would have increased to 3% the total
amount of city contracting dollars which MBEs would receive."
B. The Croson Facts
In September, 1983, the city of Richmond invited contractors to
bid on a project in which they would provide and install plumbing fixtures
for the city jail. 2 J.A Croson (Croson), a mechanical plumbing and
heating contractor who decided to bid on the contract, determined that it
would have to subcontract the provisions of the fixtures to a minority
contractor in order to ensure compliance with the 30% MBE set-aside. 3
Only one of the MBEs that Croson contacted, Continental Metal
Hose (Continental), expressed any interest in participating in the
project. 4 However, Continental had to obtain a price quotation for the
6. Id. at 712-13.
7. Id. at 713.
8. Id. However, under the city's procurement policies, a general right of protest was
available. Id. (citing Richmond, Va., Code, § 12-126(a) (1985)).
9. Id. (quoting Richmond, Va., Code, § 12-158(a)).
10. Id. at 714.
11. Id. at 715.
12. Id. (the project involved the installation of stainless steel urinals and water closets
in the city jail and specified the use of two manufacturers' fixtures).




fixtures before it could submit its bid to Croson.Y Continental contacted
one supplier who had already given Croson a low bid on the fixtures and
so refused to quote Continental on the same project.16 Another supplier,
one of the two manufacturers of the fixtures specified in the contract,
refused to quote a price until it had obtained a credit check on
Continental, which was expected to take a minimum of 30 days to
complete.17 The sealed bids for the city were due on October 12, 1983,
less than thirty days away.' Thus, when Croson submitted its bid to the
city, it had not yet received Continental's bid on the fixtures.19
When the bids were opened on October 13, 1983, Croson's was the
lowest.2 Six days later, still without a bid from Continental, Croson
submitted a waiver request to the city's procurement office. 1  When
Continental learned of Croson's waiver request, it contacted the second of
the two manufacturers specified in the contract and, shortly thereafter,
informed the city procurement office that it could supply the fixtures.2
Continental then submitted a bid to Croson which was $6,183.29 higher
than the price Croson had included in its bid to the city.'
On November 2, 1983, Croson's waiver request was denied and
Croson was given ten days to comply with the MBE provision.' Croson
responded by arguing for either a waiver of the MBE requirement or
authorization to raise the contract price of the project.' The city
rejected both requests and informed Croson that the project was going to





19. Id. (Croson's bid contained its own estimate of how much the fixtures would cost).
20. Id.
21. Id. (the waiver request stated that Continental was "unqualified" for the project
and that other MBEs "had been unresponsive or unable to quote' a price for the fixtures).
22. Id.
23. Id. (after adding in the costs of bonding and insurance, the cost of using
Continental as a subcontractor for the project would have raised Croson's bid to
$7,663.16).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 715-16. Croson also explained in its response to the city's procurement
office that Continental's quotation was much higher than any other quotation received by
them. Id. at 715.
26. Id. at 716.
Symp. 1990]
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the set-aside program was unconstitutional.27
The district court found the Plan constitutional and the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.28 Subsequently, the United
States Supreme Court decided Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,"
which also involved an equal protection challenge to a race-conscious
remedial plan.a° On Croson's petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court
vacated the Fourth Circuit's decision and "remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of Wygant."31  On reconsideration, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court.32 Applying a standard of strict scrutiny,
the Fourth Circuit held that the Plan violated the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause because it was neither justified by a compelling
governmental interest nor narrowly tailored to accomplish its purported
remedial purpose.33 On appeal by the city of Richmond, the Supreme
Court affirmed.'
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Croson decision is severely fragmented. The opinion, written
by Justice O'Connor, contains six sections, three of which garnered support
by a majority of the Court, two of which were supported by a plurality, and
one section in which only two other justices joined.
27. Id. Croson brought the suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia. Id.
28. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 194 (4th Cir. 1985).
29. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
30. See id. (Powell, J., plurality opinion). The Court in Wygant held that a race-
conscious plan designed to prevent the layoff of minority teachers with less seniority than
nonminorities in order to maintain a racially integrated workforce was unconstitutional. Id.
In applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the layoff plan, which had been agreed to by both
the school board and the local teacher's union, the plurality further noted that "[s]ocietal
discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy.' Id. at 276.
31. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986).
32. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 882 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987).
33. See id. at 1360.
34. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 730.
35. Id. at 712. The majority consisted of O'Connor, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., and
White, Stevens, Kennedy and Scalia, JJ. However, Scalia, J., joined in the judgment and,
like Kennedy and Stevens, JJ., also wrote a separate concurrence. Id. Marshall, J., wrote
a dissenting opinion in which Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Id. Blackmun, J., also
wrote a separate dissent in which Brennan, J., joined. Id. Section I of the opinion,
although joined in by a majority of the court, merely recites the facts, thus, it will not be
discussed in further detail. See id. at 713-17.
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A. The Majority Opinion
Section I1-B of the opinion criticized Richmond's set-aside plan
as being unsupported by any evidence of past discrimination.'
According to the majority, the city of Richmond failed to demonstrate a
compelling interest in its adoption of the Plan beyond a "generalized
assertion" that there had been past discrimination in the entire construction
industry.17 As a result, the plan was found to have "no logical stopping
point" and the 30% set-aside figure was deemed to have been arbitrarily
chosen, bearing no relation to any identifiable past discrimination.38 The
majority believed that the Richmond City Council could have used any
percentage for the set-aside because the evidence on which the Council
relied in drafting the Plan provided no guidance in determining the precise
scope of the injury the Council sought to remedy.
39
Section IV attacked the plan for not being sufficiently tailored to
achieve its stated remedial purpose.' The Council was faulted for not
having considered race-neutral alternatives4" and for using a "rigid
numerical quota," rather than deciding on a case-by-case basis whether a
particular MBE had suffered from the effects of past discrimination.42
The 30% figure was specifically assailed by the majority as constituting
"outright racial balancing" and "rest[ing] upon the 'completely unrealistic'
assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep
proportion to their representation in the local population."43
B. The Standard of Strict Scrutiny
Section III-A of the opinion declared that the appropriate standard
36. Id. at 723-25.
37. Id. at 724. The Court acknowledged the widespread effects of discrimination but
reasoned that "[w]hile there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public
discrimination has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this
observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota." Id. The Court went on
to find that none of the City's findings provided them "with a 'strong basis in evidence for
its conclusion that remedial action was necessary." Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion)).
38. Id. at 723-24.
39. Id. at 723.
40. Id. at 728-29.
41. Id. at 728.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421, 494 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Symp. 199o]
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of review applicable to racial classifications under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment is one of strict scrutiny.44 Thus, to
survive an equal protection challenge, a majority of the Court agreed that
a state must: 1) demonstrate a compelling interest justifying its use of race
based legislation; and 2) show that the legislation is narrowly tailored in
achieving this stated purpose.45 Where the plurality and the concurrences
differ is in determining when a state has not met this burden.
To pass muster under the plurality's strict scrutiny test, race-based
legislation must be adopted for the purpose of eradicating the effects of
past discrimination as evidenced by judicial, legislative, or administrative
findings of constitutional or statutory violations.' Justice O'Connor's
opinion requires that racial classifications be strictly reserved for remedial
settings to avoid promoting the perception of racial inferiority and creating
a climate of racial hostility.4  However, the Court drew a line at those
instances where a government seeks to remedy "societal discrimination."'
The use of race-conscious measures for this purpose is deemed to be
inappropriate, being too broad in scope to provide a basis for determining
the magnitude of the injury being remedied. 49
Justice Stevens in his concurrence disagreed, declaring that
race-based legislation does not always have to be remedial in nature, but
rather, may be legitimate where it seeks to "produce tangible and fully
justified future benefits [for the public] . . . ." He found this interest
more compelling than one of remedying past discrimination because he
believed that courts are better equipped than legislatures to identify past
wrongdoers and fashion remedies which will appropriately redress the
44. Id. at 721-22 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). "Absent searching judicial inquiry
into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining
what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial.'" Id. at 721.
45. Id. Section 111-A of Justice O'Connor's opinion is joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and White and Kennedy, JJ. Id. at 712.
46. Id. at 721. Although Section III-A is only joined by a plurality of the Court, the
positions of the concurrences by Justices Stevens and Scalia create, for the first time, a
majority of the Court in adopting this standard of review. See id. at 730 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (rather than debate the standard of review to use, the Court should "identify
the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged classes that may justify their
disparate treatment'; however, Stevens, J., in effect applies strict scrutiny); id. at 735
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("I agree with much of the Court's opinion, and, in particular, with
its conclusion that strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classification by race,
whether or not its asserted purpose is 'remedial' or 'benign.").
47. Id. at 727.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 730 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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wrongs committed."1 For Justice Stevens, the proper equal protection
inquiry in cases challenging racial classifications focuses upon identifying
the characteristics of the classes advantaged and disadvantaged by the
legislation to determine whether their disparate treatment serves some
overall public benefit.52
Justice Scalia applied the strict scrutiny standard more narrowly
than either Justice Stevens or the plurality.53 According to Scalia, a state
demonstrates a sufficiently compelling interest in using racial classifications
in only those instances where it seeks to eliminate its own maintenance of
a system of unlawful racial discrimination.54 Once that system is
dismantled, Scalia stated, that the government is under "no further
obligation to use racial re-assignments to eliminate [the] continuing effects"
of the prior discrimination.5
C. The Power of the Government to Remedy Discrimination
In Section II of the opinion Justice O'Connor argued that under
the fourteenth amendment Congress possesses broader powers than the
states to employ race-conscious remedial legislation.56 Specifically, she
declared, that because § 5 of the fourteenth amendment expressly
authorizes Congress to enforce the equal protection guarantees of § 1,
Congress is constitutionally mandated to use affirmative measures to
ensure compliance." When considering the states, Justice O'Connor
defined the situation quite differently. Calling attention to § 1 of the
amendment, Justice O'Connor reasoned that this section prohibits the
states from denying equal protection guarantees to individuals within their
jurisdictions and deemed it a restriction on state authority to enact
race-conscious legislation.58 Thus, according to Justice O'Connor, where
Congress is constitutionally empowered to act under the fourteenth
51. Id. at 731-32.
52. Id. at 732 & n.6 (relying on Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
452-53 (1971)).
53. Id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 737.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 718-19 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 719. "[T]he Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments ... 'were intended
to be, what they really are, limitations on the power of states and enlargements of the
power of Congress.'" Id. (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)). See also
U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
58. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
Syrup. 1990]
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amendment, the states are constitutionally constrained from acting. 9
In Section V, Justice O'Connor described further limitations on the
ability of state and local governments to remedy discrimination.10 She
determined that these governments may adopt an affirmative action plan
only in certain instances.6' Although supported by only a plurality of the
Court, this position represents a major departure from prior decisions
which have held that affirmative action plans need not be based upon
findings of discrimination against particular individuals to be legitimate.62
D. The Dissent
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, attacked the majority's
application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs declaring that
by employing the same standard of review to these remedial programs as
that applied to invidious discrimination, the majority had relegated
discrimination to "a phenomenon of the past."' He also argued that the
majority's reasoning was flawed and unsupported by precedent.6
IV. DISCUSSION
The essence of the majority's position in Croson is that the
Richmond set-aside plan is unsupported by sufficient proof of past racial
59. Id.
60. Id. at 729-30.
61. These instances being where: 1) the plan will remedy the effects of discrimination
against identified victims; and 2) no race-neutral alternative is available. Id. In part V of
her opinion Justice O'Connor states that "[e]ven in the absence of evidence of
discrimination, the city has at its disposal a whole array of race-neutral devices.. . ." Id.
This tends to reinforce her earlier observation that the city of Richmond, when enacting
the plan, did not adequately explore the use of a race-neutral means as required. Id. at
728. "In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several
factors, including the efficacy of alternative remedies .... " Id. (quoting United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987)).
62. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986)
(Powell, J., plurality opinion); id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 305 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). "[A] remedial purpose need not be accompanied by contemporaneous
findings of discrimination to be accepted as legitimate as the public actor has a firm basis
for believing that remedial action is required." Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
63. Id. at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 754 ("Nothing in the Constitution or in the prior decisions of this court
supports limiting state authority to confront the effects of past discrimination to those




discrimination in the Richmond construction industry.' What is most
disturbing about this position is that it has the effect of completely altering
the nature of "acceptable" evidence in affirmative action challenges."
The Court dismissed outright, evidence which heretofore had been deemed
probative in establishing the present day effects of past discrimination67
and now seems to be requiring a more burdensome, and in some cases
repetitious, factfinding process in which states and local governments must
engage before adopting an affirmative action plan.'
The Court rejected Richmond's finding that racial discrimination
had been and continued to be a problem in the construction industry
nationwide.6 Although the Council had before it an array of
congressional and agency based studies, which documented the racially
exclusive practices of businesses throughout the nation, the Croson
majority disparaged the Council for relying on these findings.' The
Court declared the evidence irrelevant and inconsequential, purportedly
because the evidence failed to document the actual experiences faced by
minority contractors in Richmond. 7' This was, to say the least, quite an
unusual conclusion for the Court to reach given that many of these
documents were the same reports on which Congress had relied when it
passed the Public Works Employment Act of 1977. 7 Section 103(t)(2) of
that Act was a minority set-aside provision which required state and local
governments to award at least 10% of their federal grants to MBEs.'
The Richmond plan was closely patterned on this Act.74
When the Public Works Employment Act set-aside plan was
challenged in Fullilove v. Klutznick, the United States Supreme Court
65. Id. at 724 (majority opinion).
66. Cf. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 289 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., concurring). See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
67. Compare Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 726 (Court dismissing as irrelevant congressional
findings of nationwide discrimination in the construction industry) with Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 477-78 (1980) (Court accepting as determinative these same
findings in upholding an MBE set-aside plan).
68. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723-28.
69. Id. at 723 ('[A] generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in
an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body .....
70. Id. at 724-27.
71. Id. "The probative value of these findings for demonstrating the existence of
discrimination in Richmond is extremely limited." Id. at 726.
72. Pub. L No. 95-28, 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (91 Stat.) 116
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701, 6706, 6707, 6709, 6710 (1988)).
'73. Id. § 103(f)(2).
74. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 712-13. The Plan required that 50% of all contracts be
awarded to minorities. Id. at 713.
Syrup. 1990]
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upheld the measure, pointing to the very same type of congressional
studies as were relied upon in Croson as strong evidence of discrimination
in the construction industry both nationwide and locally.75 As the
Fullilove Court observed, these congressional studies documented that there
was a nationwide pattern of discrimination in the construction industry
against minority businesses in the assignment of federal, state and local
contracts.7' Thus, it is difficult to understand how the Croson Court can
declare that these same studies have "extremely limited" probative value on
the issue of discrimination in the Richmond construction industry.77
In condemning Richmond's reliance on the congressional findings
of discrimination, the majority in Croson declared that information cannot
be shared from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.' The obvious result of this
ruling is that it tremendously increases the expense of enacting voluntary
governmental affirmative action plans and, consequently, decreases the
incentive of these bodies to do so. Furthermore, no one argues against the
fact that each state must engage to some degree in its own independent
fact-finding before adopting an affirmative action plan. The city of
Richmond had held a series of hearings to do just that, nevertheless, the
Court rejected this evidence deeming that it, like the congressional
findings, lacked probative value on the issue of actual discrimination in the
Richmond construction industry.' This dismissal squarely contradicts
75. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 477-78 (1980) (Burger, C.J., plurality
opinion).
With respect to the MBE provision,
Congress had abundant evidence from which it
could conclude that minority businesses have been
denied effective participation in public contracting
opportunities by procurement practices that
perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination...
. Although much of this history related to the
experience of minority businesses in the area of
federal procurement, there was direct evidence
before the Congress that this pattern of
disadvantage and discrimination existed with
respect to state and local construction contracting
as well.
Id.
76. Id. at 478.
77. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 726.
78. See id. at 727 ("It is essential that State and local agencies also establish the
presence of discrimination in their own bailiwicks....") (quoting Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE
W. 453, 480-81 (1987)).
79. Id. at 724.
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precedent and common sense."
For example, the Council heard testimony that the major
Richmond area construction trade associations had virtually no minorities
among their hundreds of members." Although representatives from
several of the construction trade associations denied that their organization
engaged in discrimination, none controverted these statistics.8 These
associations are vital networking operations, helping members procure
business.' The fact that these organizations had few minority members
was very telling on the ability of minority businesses to succeed in
Richmond and the existence of racial exclusion in the Richmond
construction industry.' Yet, the Court found this evidence not probative
of discrimination.&
Additionally, the Council had before it evidence that, although
50% of the city's population was black, less than 1% of the city's
construction contracting dollars had gone to minority prime contractors in
the five years preceding the adoption of the set-aside plan.'M The Court
disparaged the Council's reliance on this data as misplaced. 7 According
to the Court, such disparities may be probative of a pattern of
discrimination when the positions at issue are entry level positions or
require minimal training, "[b]ut where special qualifications are necessary,
the relevant statistical pool for the purposes of demonstrating
discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to
undertake the particular task."' Thus, the Court reasoned, the proper
80. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). See also
supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
81. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 726.
82. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 189 (4th Cir. 1985). The
circuit court noted that in all the hearings before the city council no opposing witness or
member of the council denied or argued against the finding that discrimination was
widespread within all facets of the City's construction industry. Id.
83. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 724. Some of these trade associations consist of all white
membership.
84. Id. at 726.
85. Id. ("[S]tanding alone this evidence is not probative of any discrimination in the
local construction industry.').
86. Id. at 714 (the exact percentage of contracts awarded to minority business
enterprises was .67%).
87. Id. at 725 ("Reliance on the disparity between the number of prime contracts
awarded to minority firms and the minority population of the city of Richmond is...
misplaced.").
88. Id. (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977);
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616,651-52 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Syrup. 1990]
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
comparison which the Council should have made was between the number
of qualified MBEs, those capable of performing the city contracts, and the
percentage of city contracting dollars these businesses received. 8
Prior to Croson, it had been established that, where the issue was
whether or not past discrimination had resulted in the continuing exclusion
of minorities from an historically tight-knit industry, the contrast between
population and workforce was entirely appropriate to help gauge the
degree of the exclusion." Indeed, in Fullilove, the Court found the
disparity between the percentage of federal contracts awarded to minorities
and the percentage of minorities in the general population to be significant
because it documented "the existence and maintenance of barriers to
competitive access which had their roots in racial and ethnic discrimination
"91
The standard of comparison articulated by the majority in Croson
assumes that all things are equal between the races when it comes to
establishing a construction business.' If this assumption were correct
then perhaps it would have been more plausible for the Court to have
declared that the relevant comparison for the purpose of proving past
discrimination is between the number of qualified MBEs and the number
of contracts awarded. However, as the statistics on membership in the
trade associations highlight, that assumption was invalid." Thus, it
becomes necessary to gauge the degree to which past discrimination
operated to prevent minorities from obtaining the experience they need to
establish a construction business. This cannot be determined without
comparing the number of minorities in the general population to the
number of public contracts awarded.'
The other major area of attack by the Court concerned the
set-aside plan itself.O After examining several factors, the Court decided
that even if Richmond had demonstrated a compelling interest in adopting
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616 (1987); United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979);
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
91. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
92. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 725. The Court, in establishing the relevant labor pool
comparison as being between those minorities present in the workforce and those in the
general population qualified for the positions in question, proceeded under the incorrect
assumption that the ability to acquire the necessary skills is equal for all races and ethnic
groups. Id.
93. Id. at 726 ("The City [found] . . .evidence that MBE membership in local
contractor associations was low.').
94. See id. at 746-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 728-29 (majority opinion).
[Vol. VII
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an affirmative action plan, such as eradicating the present effects of proven
past discrimination, the plan that it had approved was not sufficiently
narrowly tailored to address that interest. 96
Justice O'Connor described the Plan as inflexible even though the
Plan contained a waiver provision.' She dismissed the waiver provision
because it focused on the availability of MBEs rather than actual victims
of past discrimination." According to Justice O'Connor's reasoning, any
white general contractor desiring to do business with the city of Richmond
should have been allowed to obtain a waiver from the 30% set-aside
whenever an MBE failed to show that it had been an actual victim of past
discrimination." Once again, Justice O'Connor advocated a position
which contradicts prior court rulings.0 ° In Wygant, a majority of the
Court expressly rejected the requirement that affirmative action plans be
designed only to benefit specific victims of discrimination.' 1 Such a
requirement was deemed too onerous and unsupported by the
Constitution.'02 Indeed, even Justice O'Connor agreed that "a plan need
not be limited to the remedying of specific instances of identified
discrimination for it to be deemed sufficiently 'narrowly tailored,' or
'substantially related,' to the correction of prior discrimination by the state
actor."13
The rationale against Justice O'Connor's position is the realization
that discrimination, where it has been the pattern and practice of business,
is not confined to isolated instances, but rather, disadvantages an entire
group or class of people."° Under the majority view, discrimination
would become, essentially, business as usual. By requiring a state to
restrict its use of affirmative action plans to only those instances where
specific victims of discrimination are involved, the fact that an entire group
has been victimized will be wholly ignored.
96. Id. at 729 ('We think it obvious that such a program is not narrowly tailored to
remedy the effects of prior discrimination.!).
97. Id. at 728-29.
98. Id. at 729 ('Unlike the program upheld in Fullilove, the Richmond Plan's waiver
system focuses solely on the availability of MBE's; there is no inquiry into whether or not
the particular MBE seeking a racial preference has suffered from the effects of past
discrimination. . .
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 289 (1985)
(O'Connor, 3., concurring).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 312 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 282-83.
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The Court also criticized the Plan for requiring a set-aside of
30%.1" According to the Court, this figure appeared to have been
chosen arbitrarily, unrelated to the availability of MBEs, thus, constituting
a "rigid racial quota."1" This criticism is wholly without merit given that
the Richmond figure was patterned on the Fullilove precedent. 1' 7 As
Justice Powell noted in Fullilove, Congress' 10% figure fell "roughly
halfway between the present percentage of minority contractors and the
percentage of minority group members in the nation."" Similarly,
Richmond's 30% figure fell roughly halfway between the present
percentage of MBEs in Richmond and the percentage of minorities in
Richmond.'0 To uphold Congress' finding of a halfway point between
the percentage of minorities in jobs and the percentage of minorities in the
general population while condemning the city of Richmond's similar action
is hypocritical.
Moreover, restricting the numerical goal solely to the availability
of MBEs without taking general population percentages into account, will
foster the maintenance of the status quo; few minority business enterprises.
If the development of more strong and viable MBEs is one of the goals of
a set-aside plan, as both Congress and the Richmond City Council
declared, ° then the plin must be devised in a way which will encourage
minority members in the general population to establish new MBEs. By
setting a percentage which correlates the number of existing MBEs with
the number of minorities in the general local population, a municipality
creates an environment which encourages minorities to establish new
MBEs. If, however, the set-aside percentage is set at the number of
existing MBEs, then a municipality will create only enough business for
those MBEs. The likelihood that other minorities would be encouraged
to establish their own contracting businesses in an industry dominated by
discrimination where non-discriminatory business opportunities are minimal
is doubtful. Thus, the Richmond plan, like the Fullilove plan should not
have been criticized for its set-aside goal.'
The Court also criticized the Plan for being overinclusive because
it included Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo and Aleut persons
105. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728.
i06. Id. at 724.
107. Id. at 714. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
108. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
109. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 459 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion); Croson, 109 S. Ct.
at 713.
111. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 751-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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within its definition of minority."n The Court stated that "[t]he random
inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may never have
suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond,
suggests that perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past
discrimination."113 Here, too, the Court appears to forget that the racial
groups included in the Richmond plan are the very same racial groups
included in the Fullilove plan."'
Finally, the Court attacked the Council for having employed
race-conscious measures without first having considered race-neutral
alternatives.1" This criticism would have been valid were it not for the
fact that Congress had already made findings that race-neutral remedies
would not be effective in combatting discrimination in the construction
industry.116  It is unclear why the Court is requiring municipalities to
ignore the findings of other jurisdictions, including Congress, no matter
how relevant the information to the municipality." 7 Following the
Court's rationale, Richmond should have gone through an expensive and
time consuming process of employing race neutral measures which had
already been proven ineffective before it adopted the set-aside plan."
This position is neither tenable nor supported by the Constitution."9
Little in the Croson majority opinion is supported by precedent or
required by the Constitution. In fact, both precedent and the Constitution
contradict the findings of the Croson court." ° Politics rather than legal
logic constitutes the only plausible explanation for the differing results in
Fullilove and Croson. The Court that decided Fullilove in 1980 was not the
112. Id. at 727-28 (majority opinion). Justice O'Connor concluded that "[t]here [was]
absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Eskimo,
or Aleut persons in any aspect of the Richmond construction industry." Id. (emphasis in
original).
113. Id. at 728.
114. See Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 454 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion); Croson, 109 S.
Ct. at 713. The congressional plan involved in Fullilove also included Spanish-speaking
persons, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 459 (Burger, C.J.,
plurality opinion). It is worthy to note that in Fullilove Congress, like the Richmond City
Council, had no specific evidence pointing to any discrimination against these particular
groups and relied solely upon the disparity in statistics between the general percentage of
MBE's in the industry and the percentage of minorities in the general population. Id.
115. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728.
116. Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citingFullilove, 448 U.S. at 463-67 (Burger,
C.J., plurality opinion)).
117. Id. at 749.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 750.
120. Id. at 754.
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Court that decided Croson in 1989.121 By the time that Croson was
decided, Justice Powell, who concurred in the Fullilove judgment, had been
replaced by Justice Kennedy.1" The Croson court was overwhelmingly
conservative and because affirmative action plans have never been viewed
favorably by the politically conservative, it is not surprising that the Court
ruled as it did." This may also explain why the Court adopted a strict
scrutiny standard of review for government sponsored affirmative action
plans.m
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,"2' a majority of
the United States Supreme Court agreed that, given the history of racial
discrimination in this country, it was appropriate to allow admissions
officers to use race as one positive factor when making their admissions
decisions."2' In doing so, the Court created a distinction between
programs designed to discriminate on the basis of race and those designed
to remedy the effects of past discrimination on the basis of race." Such
a distinction seems appropriate; affirmative action programs are neither
designed nor intended to promote racial hatred and separatism.12 ' Nor
are these programs "drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to
another . . . . Rather, these programs employ racial classifications
121. Compare Fuilove, 448 U.S. at 452 (Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion of
the Court in Fullilove, but he was not a member of the Croson Court) with Croson, 109
S. Ct. at 712 (Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in Croson, but she was not
part of the Fullilove Court).
122. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 452 (Powell, J., joined the opinion of the Court penned
by Burger, C.J.); Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 712 (Kennedy, J., joined the "conservative" majority
opinion penned by O'Connor, J.).
123. See Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 44 (1989).
124. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721.
125. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality decision).
126. Id. at 319-20 & n.53. "Universities... may make individualized decisions, in
which ethnic background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate
educational purpose." Id. at 319 n.53. Justice Powell also expressed this view in part V-C
of his opinion which announced the decision of a plurality of the Court. Id. at 320 (Part
V-C of Justice Powell's opinion was joined by White, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun,
JJ., making a majority of the court on this issue).
127. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) (where a
remedial race based program passed by Congress was submitted to a lesser standard
judicial scrutiny).
128. See, e.g., id. at 459 (the program in Fullilove was designed to stimulate MBE's
in the industry involved).
129. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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solely for remedial purposes, seeking to counter the centuries of lawful
racism perpetrated by this country.13°
Given this distinction, it seems appropriate that a lesser standard
of review than one of strict scrutiny should be adopted to analyze these
programs. In Bakke, a plurality of the Court argued for the adoption of
an intermediate standard of review.M Such a standard would, the
plurality claimed, avoid the fatal effect that a strict scrutiny analysis would
have on these remedial programs and also provide sufficient safeguard
against their misuse under a rational basis analysis.132 Justice Marshall
reiterated this argument for an intermediate standard of review in his
Croson dissent.133 Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of the Croson
Court, criticized the standard, determining that courts would find it difficult
to recognize when a racial classification was being used for a remedial or
an invidious purpose."4
To illustrate her point, Justice O'Connor noted that on the
Richmond City Council a majority of the seats were held by blacks."
Thus, she declared that under "the circumstances of this case" a heightened
level of scrutiny was necessary to ensure that the Council was not acting
130. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 461 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). During the
passage of the congressional legislation involved in Fullilove, Representative Biaggi of New
York noted that, without the provision which implemented the remedial plan, the
legislation would "perpetuate the historic practices that have precluded minority business
enterprises from effective participation in public contracting...." Id. (quoting 123 CONG.
REQ 5331 (1977) (statement of Rep. Biaggi)).
131. Id. at 356-62 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
132. Id. Under the intermediate standard of review, an affirmative action plan would
comport with the fourteenth amendment guarantees where: 1) racial classifications are not
used to stereotype or stigmatize a politically powerless segment of society;, 2) the plan
would not restrict fundamental rights; and 3) the racial classifications would serve
important governmental objectives and be substantially related to achievement of these
objectives. Id. at 359.
133. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 721 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor declared that
"[t]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme." Id.
at 722 (quoting Weinberg v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)). Justice O'Connor also
stated that "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications' are 'benign' or
'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics." Id. at 721.
135. Id. at 722 (Justice O'Connor noted that five of the nine City Council seats were
held by blacks).
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to disadvantage whites when it enacted the set-aside plan." Apparently,
Justice O'Connor chose to ignore the fact that whites comprised 50% of
the population in Richmond.0 7 More importantly, she chose to overlook
the fact that strict scrutiny has traditionally been applied only in those
circumstances where a group has been declared a suspect class. m The
"traditional indicia of suspectness" has required that courts consider
whether a given group has been "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process."139
Justice O'Connor's implication that the white citizens of Richmond
have been so victimized by racial discrimination as to warrant suspect
status and require strict scrutiny of the Richmond set-aside plan, is the
epitome of ignorance and/or insensitivity.Y The history of racial
discrimination against blacks in Richmond is well known. 41 Taking into
account this history, the Richmond City Council's decision to adopt a set-
aside plan, should be presumed to be remedial. Nevertheless, Justice
Marshall did not advocate that such a presumption be given to legislation
simply because a municipality asserts a remedial purpose.'42 Like the
Croson majority, Marshall would require governments to produce
satisfactory proof of past racial discrimination to support the claim that
remedial legislation was necessary.43  Unlike the majority, however,
Justice Marshall would allow a trial court's evaluation of the government's
evidence to proceed along the same lines as had been approved in prior
decisions.1M
The Court's decision to require the exacting strict scrutiny standard
of review for affirmative action programs is wholly unnecessary to
safeguard the interests of non-minorities who have enjoyed centuries of
advantage from the legal subjugation of racial minorities."~ Justice
Marshall described it best when he observed:
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 753 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
140. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 722.
141. See id. at 740 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 747.
143. Id. at 745.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 753. Justice Marshall noted that "It cannot seriously be suggested that
nonminorities ... have any 'history of purposeful unequal treatment." Id. (quoting
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28).
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In concluding that remedial classifications warrant
no different standard of review under the Constitution
than the most brute and repugnant forms of state-
sponsored racism, a majority of this Court signals that it
regards racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of
the past, and that government bodies need no longer
preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice. I,
however, do not believe this Nation is anywhere close to
eradicating racial discrimination or its vestiges. In
constitutionalizing its wishful thinking, the majority today
does a grave disservice not only to those victims of past
and present racial discrimination in this Nation whom
government has sought to assist, but also to this Court's
long tradition of approaching issues of race with the
utmost sensitivity.46
V. CROSON'S IMPACT
The most obvious result one can expect from Croson is an increase
in the number of court cases challenging state sponsored affirmative action
plans. To the extent that state and local governments relied on Fullilove
in drafting their plans, they can expect a difficult battle. Given the
heightened level of scrutiny and the evidentiary hurdles which Croson
requires, it is doubtful that many of these challenges will be successfully
thwarted.'4 Conversely, one can then expect to see a decrease in the
number of voluntarily enacted plans. States will find the mandated process
of documenting particularized instances of past discrimination arduous and
costly.' Moreover, if states must tailor their plans such that only
identified actual victims of discrimination can benefit, the effort will rarely
be viewed as worthwhile. 49
More significantly, however, is the effect this case will have on the
economic development of racial minorities in this country. Government
initiatives which mitigate racial discrimination in the labor market and
business sphere and positively impact on the development of MBEs will be
discouraged. While, admittedly, it is not the role of government to create
a totally risk-free environment for minority businesses, it is certainly the
responsibility of government to ensure that all of its citizens share
146. Id. at 752.
147. See id. at 721 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 727 (majority opinion).
148. Id. at 727.
149. Id. at 728-29.
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equitably in the economy."s The government must open doors for the
traditionally excluded if for no other reason than self-interest; the more
people included in the labor market the stronger the state's economy.5
One of the most important ways by which the government can
fulfill its obligation to those traditionally excluded is by invoking its power
of the public purse. How a state chooses to spend or not to spend its
revenues impacts tremendously on all its citizens. While it is important for
government to articulate a public policy of non-discrimination, it is far
more effective for government to "put its money where its mouth is" and
support its policy with actual dollars. Such government intervention, like
vigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, sends a strong message
to the public that discrimination will not be tolerated, while simultaneously
providing minorities with opportunities for employment where before none
had existed. The Croson decision constitutes a disincentive for the
enactment of state-sponsored affirmative action plans and will negatively
impact on the economic development of racial minorities.152
Finally, it should be noted that the Croson decision has created a
double standard for review of affirmative action plans. a  Public
employers who voluntarily adopt affirmative action plans will face
challenges under the fourteenth amendment's strict scrutiny standard. 4
Private employers, however, will only be challenged under the lesser,
restrictive standards of title VII.15s Under the Croson standard, public
employers will have to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest
justifying the use of racial classifications." 6 To do so a municipality will
have to present evidence, based on its own studies, etc., of particularized
findings of prior discrimination. 7  Findings regarding societal
discrimination will not be probative.' Assuming this requirement is met,
a municipality will still have to demonstrate that its plan is narrowly
tailored.159 Thus, the plan will have to be flexible, meaning that it must
contain a waiver provision which focuses upon actual victims of
discrimination. 6" If a numerical goal is employed, then there must be a
150. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
151. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 744 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 744, 752.
153. Id. at 721 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
154. Id.
155. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
156. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 727.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 724.
159. Id. at 728.
160. Id. at 728-29.
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reasonable correlation between the goal set and the relevant labor
pool.'6' Comparisons based on population pools will not be considered
probative.1"' Regardless of how well documented the discrimination, no
plan will pass constitutional muster unless the municipality itself first
considered nonracial alternatives."
Under the standard articulated in title VII cases, private employers
are able to articulate a broader array of interests as justification for their
use of racial classifications.' They are not required to identify
discrimination with the same specificity as public employers.'" For
example, they may adopt race-conscious measures to correct a gross
underrepresentation of minorities in an historically segregated job
classification, as was the case in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa
Clara County, California." Under title VII, private employers are not
required to admit that have they engaged in discrimination or. point the
finger at anyone else.' 67 Instead, employers may use evidence that a
gross statistical disparity exists between the number of minorities and non-
minorities employed within their workforce as sufficient proof of
discrimination.'6 Additionally, private employers will find it easier to
demonstrate that their plans are narrowly tailored.'" Numerical goals
based on comparisons between the number of minorities in the workforce
and the number of minorities in the general local population will be
permissible. 70 While private employers will have to draft plans which
are flexible, they will not be forced to limit the beneficiaries of their plans
to actual victims harmed.' 7'
VI. CONCLUSION
The Croson decision represents a dramatic step backwards in the
struggle to combat discrimination.72 The application of a standard of
161. Id. at 725.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 728.
164. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616,
633 n.10 (1987).
165. Id. at 632-33.
166. Id. at 630.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 632.
169. Id. at 633 & n.11.
170. Id. at 631-32.
171. Id. at 638.
172. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 740 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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strict scrutiny mandated by the Court'"7 is certain to sound the death
knell for state-sponsored affirmative action plans across the nation. The
significance of this becomes more compelling when one realizes that,
traditionally, public employers have provided a higher share of good jobs
for racial minorities than the private sector.' Thus, for example, in the
construction industry, minority contractors have had a disproportionate
amount of their overall business in state-supported projects." Yet, put
in its proper perspective, the Croson decision, while damaging to
affirmative action, is not all that surprising. The conservative mood of the
Supreme Court makes clear that the eradication of racial discrimination is
not a high priority, if, in fact, it is one at all. 6  The judicial branch has
demonstrated, in no uncertain terms, its antipathy for civil rights issues.
173. Id. at 721 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
174. Havemann, Profiles of a Shifting U.S. Workforce; More Minorities, Women in
Government; Domestic Agencies Smaller, Wash. Post, Aug. 17, 1989, at A25, col. 1.
("Minority group employment has grown to 27 percent of the federal work force, and
virtually every minority group -- native American, Asian, Hispanic and black -- is present
in proportionally larger numbers than in private employment . . .
175. See, e.g., Discrimination in Atlanta's Business Sector "Deeply Rooted," Report
Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 141, at A-6 (July 23, 1990).
176. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 757 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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